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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO

MR. LYMAN KIRKPATRICK, Inspector Gen.

DATE: 13 July 1953

FROM

25X1A

I feel that the time has arrived when the Agency must face up to the Personnel problem.

I do not feel that the present situation is anyone's fault but is a combination of rapid expansion, specialized needs and general ailments surrounding the business of growing up.

In the preparation of my reply I asked our people to run through a discussion of the problem, including the present situation and recommendations for the future. Our paper is attached. I realize it may be a little more than you asked for but I felt I wanted to have a review of the more important elements before

we presented our recommendations.

NO CHANGE IN CLASS.

☐ DECLASSIFIED

CLASS, CHANGED TO: TS S C

NEXT REVIEW DATE:

AUTH: HR 7.0-2

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MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. LYMAN KIRKPATRICK Inspector General

The following comments are submitted in response to your memorandum in which you asked for remarks on the services furnished by the Personnel Office. The following statement is organized into three parts: 1) The Present Situation, 2) The Future, 3) Recommendations.

I. THE PRESENT SITUATION

A. General Comment. The Personnel situation as I have observed it and as observed by the Chairman of the PM Career Service Board is not satisfactory. This is not intended as a criticism of those presently engaged in Personnel Administration within the Agency. The faults are fundamental. While at the present time they appear serious, as in fact they are, they are not unique to CIA. All rapidly expanding organizations have faced similar problems. In CIA these problems are aggravated by the need for a very large variety of specialized skills. However, whether the ailment is general or specific the fact remains that the Agency Personnel Policy is confused and the efforts of those working in the field of Personnel Administration have lacked direction. Personnel Authority has been assumed at several levels of the Agency and is not properly centralized. As a result the personnel arrangements lack consistency. In addition, an undue amount of time of a considerable number of people

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is required to resolve ordinary personnel matters. That Personnel has been administered as effectively as it has is good testimony to the dedication of those working in the field. Their path has not been a very easy one.

B. Rotation and Reassignment. No adequate Agency policy exists covering Rotation and Reassignment. As a result the outgoing flow of personnel to overseas activities is not programmed nor is the returning flow. Agency employees often times are reduced to the necessity of "shopping themselves". Temporary surpluses are not relieved easily by reassignment of Agency Personnel to other activities. As a result employment requests frequently are pending while other Agency activities are overstrength. A contributory factor to this is the large number of people engaged in personnel selection, any one of whom can reject the name of a nominee on the grounds of suitability. This rejection, it should be added, often is given without any appropriate evaluation or without the nominee being given an opportunity to demonstrate his suitability. Another, and probably the most important reason for the unsatisfactory Rotation among ment is the policy of "assignment by negotiation" in which unnecessarily long discussions concerning overseas assignments are conducted with employees. This is an important subject to which the attention of CIA Career Service Board and Director of Personnel must be addressed. It is suggested here that willingness to serve overseas as assigned CIA personnel must be written in the original agreements between the Agency and the employee. As is the case with

State Department, Army, Navy, and Air Force consideration would be given in hardship cases. It is significant to note that no grave difficulties are encountered in staffing the more attractive overseas stations, it is the unattractive stations where balkiness develops. It follows inescapably that due to the lack of an adequate Rotation and Reassignment Policy that highly valuable opportunities for field training in specialized situations such as Korea are missed. (1)

- C. Promotion. Closely related to Rotation and Reassignment is the matter of promotion. No Agency policy exists which covers the subject. While no promotion policy can be created which will be inviolable it does not follow that a general promotion policy should not be drafted. Such a policy would cover the several principles surrounding the development of "John Doe." The Promotion Policy should highlight the several required steps in Career Development -- Training, Domestic Assignment, Overseas Assignment, Development of a Supervisor, Additional Advanced Training as Required. Above all the Promotion Policy should detail the incentives to the employee to equip himself to expand into the wide variety of CIA Job Opportunities. For unless promotion is reserved somewhat to those who complete Training and Overseas Assignments, the incentives are removed and the personnel system tends to be deflated.
- D. Training. The heart of any Career system is located in the Training Division. Its product is the basic fundamental to the general elevation of skill. The success or failure of field operations inevitably will vary in accordance with the level of skill of the Case Officer. (2) This is generally true in industry and governmental service. It is

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⁽¹⁾ See Bradford Report on Training and Rotation Opportunities in Korea.
(2) See Report of the President's Committee on International Information

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especially true in Intelligence and Clandestine Operations where the tradecraft requirement is unique and cannot be obtained elsewhere. In no aspect of Personnel Administration is the lack of policy so clearly demonstrated as in Training. Nowhere do we have such a clear example of the general tendency to assume personnel prerogatives. Training quotas in some cases have not been met simply on the grounds that personnel cannot be spared for training. At the present time excellent classes have had to be cancelled because the number of students reporting did not justify the time of the instructional staff.

E. Career Service Board. The Career Service Board System is a valuable adjunct to Personnel Administration in CIA. Lacking centralization of personnel authority the Career Service Boards may be looked upon as an essential in the processing of Personnel Actions. However, it is, in general, a cumbersome system and, with four board functioning in DD/P, is without question somewhat inefficient. Career Service Boards have the advantage of providing an intimate type of contact with personnel actions. In many cases members of the Boards know and have served with the personnel under discussion. However, the Career Service System is not, Per Se, an adequate method of personnel administration. It is an auxiliary only and must operate within the framework of a more comprehensive structure and in accordance with a consistent Agency policy. The Career Service System has two basic disadvantages. 1) It tends to bring a large number of people into Personnel actions when many of these actions are routine and repetitive, 2) Unless properly controlled it

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tends toward staff segregation of personnel, and away from the appropriate exchange of personnel among the several activities of CIA. In connection with this latter point there is some reason to believe that we now have too many Career Service Boards. In the DD/P it probably would be more efficient to have a DD/P Board with a single working committee, made up of representatives of the several staffs, as a backstop to staff the papers for the DD/P Board and, in general, to relieve the DD/P Board of details. Under this concept the several staff boards would be dissolved.

F. The Army, Navy and Air Force very logically have provided a personnel "bank" for the Central Intelligence Agency. Rather heavy withdrawals have been made at various times and in varying quantities. The utilization of military personnel in CIA has not always proved satisfactory, a large number returning to their services prior to the completion of a tour of duty. With reduction of several thousand officers forecast under the new appropriation bills it can be assumed that the Department of Defense will review the allocations of military personnel to CIA and, in particular, will request a more adequate forecast. The Deputies of CIA should be furnished a set of criteria on utilization of military personnel and should be palled on their requirements. It is recognized that in addition to those officers needed for assignment where specific military background is a requisite, a few officers should be rotated to CIA for orientation and training.

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Officers with high potential should be selected for these rotation slots. The value of such rotation for JSC or Joint Staff duty is believed to be apparent. In connection with military personnel the real need is to work up a reasonably accurate forecast and to get it approved so that demands on Army, Navy and Air Force can be worked into the service programs on a more orderly basis.

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II. THE FUTURE

The Central Intelligence Agency now has grown to such a size that an easily functioning personnel machine is a requisite. The sheer weight of numbers involved precludes the active consideration of personnel actions by the Deputies, Staff Chiefs and others at this level. The long range requirements of the Agency dictate a program of Career development that will qualify personnel for the large number of varied assignments which will develop in the coming years.

Basically the Personnel responsibility rests with DCI. It is one of his prime responsibilities in insuring the efficient operation of CIA. To carry out this responsibility an appropriate Director of Personnel acting with the authority of DCI must develop a CIA Personnel Policy and a CIA Personnel Plan. With the approval of these documents by DCI, the Director of Personnel becomes responsible for the overall Agency Personnel operation which now is parceled around in packages of varying sizes. In assuming this responsibility the Director of Personnel must give recognition to the special needs of several CIA offices. Nevertheless, he must give prime consideration to the initiation of a consistent *gency system which among other things will include Training, Rotation and Promotion. The responsibility for consistency in the major fields of personnel administration rests with DCI. In the interests of uniformity and equity only a small part of this responsibility can be delegated below the Office of the Director of Personnel. It

should be added that he may enlist the assistance of any official in CIA in carrying out his responsibilities. But the Director of Personnel cannot shift the DCI's responsibility and authority to other shoulders.

III. RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that a Task Team representing the several offices of CIA be assembled to prepare a draft of a CIA Personnel Policy and a CIA Personnel Plan. These Policy and Planning papers would be submitted to the DCI and, if approved, would serve as guides to the Director of Personnel when he is selected. The Policy and Planning papers would be revised annually at a time when they would be of assistance in the development of the CIA Program.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. LYMAN KIRKPATRICK

INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT:

Personnel Survey

Listed below are the employees on the Staff who spend all or part of their time on personnel matters: 25X1A

25X1A

25% 25% 100% 100% 50% 50% 2% 2% 2% 2%

25X1A